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Secrecy results for compound wiretap channels
Igor Bjelakovic´,1, * Holger Boche,1, ** and Jochen Sommerfeld1, ***
1Lehrstuhl fu¨r theoretische Informationstechnik,
Technische Universita¨t Mu¨nchen, 80290 Mu¨nchen, Germany
We derive a lower bound on the secrecy capacity of the compound wiretap channel with channel
state information at the transmitter which matches the general upper bound on the secrecy capacity
of general compound wiretap channels given by Liang et al. and thus establishing a full coding
theorem in this case. We achieve this with a stronger secrecy criterion and the maximum error
probability criterion, and with a decoder that is robust against the effect of randomisation in the
encoding. This relieves us from the need of decoding the randomisation parameter which is in general
not possible within this model. Moreover we prove a lower bound on the secrecy capacity of the
compound wiretap channel without channel state information and derive a multi-letter expression
for the capacity in this communication scenario.
1. INTRODUCTION
Compound wiretap channels are among the simplest non-trivial models incorporating the requirement of
security against a potential eavesdropper while at the same time the legitimate users suffer from channel un-
certainty. They may be considered therefore as a starting point for theoretical investigation tending towards
applications, for example, in wireless systems, a fact explaining an alive research activity in this area in
recent years (cf. [1], [2] and references therein). In this article we give capacity results for different scenarios
of channel state information under a strong secrecy criterion and the maximum error probability criterion.
In a more recent work [3] the authors make use of these results to derive capacity results for arbitrarily
varying wiretap channels, a more realistic communication model, which, apart from eavesdropping, takes
into account an active adversarial jamming situation.
In this paper we consider finite families of pairs of channels W = {(Wt, Vt) : t = 1, . . . , T } with common
input alphabet and possibly different output alphabets. The legitimate users control Wt and the eavesdrop-
per observes the output of Vt. We will be dealing with two communication scenarios. In the first one the
transmitter is informed about the index t (channel state information (CSI) at the transmitter) while in the
second the transmitter has no information about that index at all (no CSI). In both scenarios the eaves-
dropper knows and the legitimate receiver does not know the channel state. This setup is a generalisation
of Wyner’s [4] wiretap channel.
Along the way we will comment what our results look like when applied to widely used class of models of
the form W = {(Wt, Vs) : t = 1, . . . , T, s = 1, . . . , S} with T 6= S which are special cases of the model we are
dealing with in this paper.
Our contributions are summarised as follows: In [1] a general upper bound on the capacity of compound
wiretap channel as the minimum secrecy capacity of the involved wiretap channels was given. We prove in
Section 3.2 that the models whose secrecy capacity matches this upper bound contain all compound wiretap
channels with CSI at the transmitter. At the same time we achieve this bound with a substantially stronger
security criterion employed already in [5], [6], [7], and [8]. Indeed, our security proof follows closely that
developed in [8] for single wiretap channel with classical input and quantum output. In order to achieve
secrecy we follow the common approach according to which randomised encoding is a permissible opera-
tion. Usually , the legitimate decoder can decode the sent codeword that represents both the message to be
transmitted and the outcome of the random experiment as well. However, in the case of compound wiretap
channel with CSI at the transmitter this strategy does not work as is illustrated by an example in Section
4.1. We resolve this difficulty by developing a decoding strategy which is independent of the particular
channel realisation and is insensitive to randomisation while decoding just at the optimal secrecy rate for all
channels {Wt : t = 1, . . . , T } simultaneously.
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2Moreover, a slight modification of our proofs allows us to determine the capacity of the compound wiretap
channel without CSI by a (non-computable) multi-letter expression. This is content of Section 3.3. We
should mention, however, that the traditional proof strategy of sending the pair consisting of message and
randomisation parameter to the legitimate receiver works as well in the case where the transmitter has no
CSI. The lower bound on the secrecy capacity, we proofed under the strong secrecy criterion, we have used
for parts of the secrecy results for arbitrarily varying wiretap channels in [3]. The lower bound on the secrecy
capacity as well the as the multi-letter expression were given earlier in [1] respective in [2] for weaker secrecy
criteria but without detailed proofs.
In Section 4.2 we give an example of compound wiretap channel such that both the set of channels to the
legitimate receiver and to the eavesdropper are convex but whose secrecy capacities with CSI and without
CSI at the transmitter are different. Indeed the former is positive while the latter is equal to 0.
Section 3.4 is devoted to the practically important modelW = {(Wt, Vs) : t = 1, . . . , T, s = 1, . . . , S} with the
assumption that the transmitter has CSI for the T -part but has no CSI for the S-part of the channel. Here
again we provide a multi-letter expression for the capacity. Additionally, we give a computable description
of the secrecy capacity in the case where the channels to the eavesdropper are degraded versions of those to
the legitimate receiver.
Our results are easily extended to arbitrary sets (even uncountable) of wiretap channels via standard ap-
proximation techniques [9].
2. COMPOUND WIRETAP CHANNELS
2.1. Definitions
Let A,B,C be finite sets and θ = {1, . . . , T } an index set. We consider two families of channels Wt : A→
P(B)1, Vt : A→ P(C), t ∈ θ, which we collectively abbreviate by W and call the compound wiretap channel
generated by the given families of channels. Here the first family represents the communication link to the
legitimate receiver while the output of the latter is under control of the eavesdropper. In the rest of the
paper expressions like W⊗nt or V
⊗n
t stand for the n-th memoryless extension of the stochastic matrices Wt,
Vt.
An (n, Jn) code for the compound wiretap channel W consists of a stochastic encoder E : Jn → P(An) (a
stochastic matrix) with a message set Jn := {1, . . . , Jn} and a collection of mutually disjoint decoding sets
{Dj ⊂ Bn : j ∈ Jn}. The maximum error probability of a (n, Jn) code Cn is given by
e(Cn) := max
t∈θ
max
j∈Jn
∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)W⊗nt (Dcj |xn). (1)
I.e. neither the sender nor the receiver have CSI.
If channel state information is available at the transmitter the notion of (n, Jn) code is modified in that the
encoding may depend on the channel index while the decoding sets remain universal, i.e. independent of the
channel index t. The probability of error in (1) changes to
eCSI(Cn) := max
t∈θ
max
j∈Jn
∑
xn∈An
Et(x
n|j)W⊗nt (Dcj |xn).
We assume throughout the paper that the eavesdropper always knows which channel is in use.
Definition 2.1. A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for the compound wiretap channel
W with or without CSI respectively if there is a sequence (Cn)n∈N of (n, Jn) codes such that
lim
n→∞
e(Cn) = 0 resp. lim
n→∞
eCSI(Cn) = 0,
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log Jn ≥ R,
1 P(B) denotes the set of probability distributions on B.
3and
lim
n→∞
max
t∈θ
I(J ;Znt ) = 0, (2)
where J is a uniformly distributed random variable taking values in Jn and Znt are the resulting random
variables at the output of eavesdropper’s channel V ⊗nt .
The secrecy capacity in either scenario is given by the largest achievable secrecy rate and is denoted by CS(W)
and CS,CSI(W).
2.2. Hints on operational meaning of strong secrecy
A weaker and widely used security criterion is obtained if we replace (2) by limn→∞maxt∈θ
1
n
I(J ;Znt ) = 0.
We prefer to follow [5], [7], and [8] and require the validity of (2). A nice discussion on interrelation of several
secrecy criteria is contained in [2]. We confine ourselves to giving some hints on the operational meaning of
the requirement (2). To this end we restrict our attention to the case where the transmitter has no CSI in
order to simplify our notation. The case of compound wiretap channel with CSI at the transmitter can be
treated accordingly. Set
εn := max
t∈θ
I(J ;Znt ) with lim
n→∞
εn = 0.
Then Pinsker’s inequality implies that
||pJZnt − pJ ⊗ pZnt || ≤ c
√
εn ∀t ∈ θ, (3)
with a positive universal constant c, where || · || is the variational distance. Suppose that the eavesdropper
chooses for each t ∈ θ decoding sets {Kj,t ⊂ Cn : j ∈ Jn} with Cn =
⋃
j∈Jn
Kj,t. We will lower bound the
average error probability (and consequently the maximum error probability) for every choice of the decoding
rule the eavesdropper might make. Set
eav(t) :=
1
Jn
∑
j∈Jn
∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)V ⊗nt (Kcj,t|xn).
Then
eav(t) =
∑
j∈Jn
pJZnt ({j} ×Kcj,t) = pJZnt
( ⋃
j∈Jn
{j} ×Kcj,t
)
≥ pJ ⊗ pZnt
( ⋃
j∈Jn
{j} ×Kcj,t
)
− c√εn
=
∑
j∈Jn
pJ ⊗ pZnt
({j} ×Kcj,t)− c√εn = 1Jn ∑
j∈Jn
pZnt (K
c
j,t)− c
√
εn
=
Jn − 1
Jn
− c√εn = 1− 1
Jn
− c√εn, (4)
where in the first and the third line we have used the fact that the sets {j} × Kcj,t, j ∈ Jn, are mutually
disjoint, the second line follows from (3), and in the fourth line we merely observed that for any non-negative
numbers a1, . . . , aJ with
∑J
j=1 aj = 1 we have
∑J
j=1(1− aj) = J − 1. Consequently, the average (and hence
maximum) error probability of every decoding strategy the eavesdropper might select tends to 1 as soon as
Jn →∞. It should be remarked, however, that although for the vast majority of messages the eavesdropper
will be in error there is still a possibility left that she/he can decode a small fraction of them correctly.
As will follow from the proofs below we will have εn = 2
−na, a > 0, and Jn = 2
nR, R > 0, if the secrecy
capacity is positive so that the speed of convergence in (4) will be exponential.
Notice that (3) means that the random variables Znt at the output of the channel to the eavesdropper are
almost independent of the random variable J embodying the messages to be transmitted to the legitimate
receiver. Therefore it is heuristically convincing that our criterion (2) offers secrecy to some extent for
communication tasks going beyond the transmission of messages. To demonstrate this by an example we
introduce, based on [10], the notion of identification attack as follows. Suppose that for each fixed t ∈ θ and
4any j ∈ Jn there is a subset Kj,t ⊂ Cn on the eavesdropper’s output alphabet where now the sets Kj,t need
not necessarily be mutually disjoint. With E : Jn → P(An) being the stochastic encoder used to transmit
messages to the legitimate receiver we can write down the identification errors of first and second kind (cf.
[10] for further explanation of this code concept) for the eavesdropper’s channel as∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)V ⊗nt (Kcj,t|xn), (5)
and ∑
xn∈An
E(xn|i)V ⊗nt (Kj,t|xn) (6)
for j, i ∈ Jn, i 6= j.
One possible interpretation of this attack, again based on [10], is that on the eavesdropper’s side of the channel
there are persons F1, . . . , FJn observing the output of the channel. The sole interest of Fj is whether or not
the message j has been sent to the legitimate receiver. Thus Fj performs the hypothesis test represented by
Kj,t based on his/her knowledge of t ∈ θ and (5), (6) are just the errors of the first resp. second kind for
that hypothesis test.
Let us define for j ∈ Jn
g(j, t) :=
∑
xn∈An
(
E(xn|j)V ⊗nt (Kcj,t|xn) +
1
Jn − 1
Jn∑
i=1
i6=j
E(xn|i)V ⊗nt (Kj,t|xn)
)
which is a number in [0, 2].
Notice that if
g(j, t) ≥ 1− η
for some η ∈ (0, 1) then either ∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)V ⊗nt (Kcj,t|xn) ≥
1− η
2
,
or there is at least one i 6= j with ∑
xn∈An
E(xn|i)V ⊗nt (Kj,t|xn) ≥
1− η
2
,
or both, so that no reliable identification of message j can be guaranteed. We show now that under assump-
tion of (2) we have
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
g(j, t) ≥ 1− ηn, ηn = o(n0) (7)
so that at most a fraction 23 (1 + ηn) of j ∈ Jn can satisfy the inequality
g(j, t) <
1
2
.
This last assertion is readily seen from (7) by applying Markov’s inequality to the set
F := {j ∈ Jn : 2− g(j, t) > 3
2
}.
5In order to prove (7), note that for any t ∈ θ
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
g(j, t) =
Jn∑
j=1
(
pJZnt ({j} ×Kcj,t) +
1
Jn − 1pJZ
n
t
({j}c ×Kj,t)
)
= pJZnt (
⋃
j∈Jn
{j} ×Kcj,t) +
1
Jn − 1
Jn∑
j=1
pJZnt ({j}c ×Kj,t)
≥ pJ ⊗ pZnt (
⋃
j∈Jn
{j} ×Kcj,t) +
1
Jn − 1
Jn∑
j=1
pJ ⊗ pZnt ({j}c ×Kj,t)− c
√
εn − c Jn
Jn − 1
√
εn
=
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
(
pZnt (K
c
j,t) + pZnt (Kj,t)
)− c√εn 2Jn − 1
Jn − 1
= 1− c√εn 2Jn − 1
Jn − 1 ,
where in the third line we have used (3) and in the fourth we inserted pJ({j}c) = Jn−1Jn .
Besides the attempts of the eavesdropper to decode or identify messages we can introduce attacks correspond-
ing to each communication task introduced in [11]. It would be interesting, not only from the mathematical
point of view, to see against which of them and to what extent secrecy can be guaranteed by the condition
(2).
3. CAPACITY RESULTS
3.1. Preliminaries
In what follows we use the notation as well as some properties of typical and conditionally typical sequences
from [12]. For p ∈ P(A), W : A→ P(B), xn ∈ An, and δ > 0 we denote by T np,δ the set of typical sequences
and by T nW,δ(xn) the set of conditionally typical sequences given xn in the sense of [12].
The basic properties of these sets that are needed in the sequel are summarised in the following three
lemmata.
Lemma 3.1. Fixing δ > 0, for every p ∈ P(A) and W : A→ P(B) we have
p⊗n(T np,δ) ≥ 1− (n+ 1)|A|2−ncδ
2
W⊗n(T nW,δ(xn)|xn) ≥ 1− (n+ 1)|A||B|2−ncδ
2
for all xn ∈ An with c = 1/(2 ln 2). In particular, there is n0 ∈ N such that for each δ > 0 and p ∈ P(A),
W : A→ P(B) and n > n0
p⊗n(T np,δ) ≥ 1− 2−nc
′δ2
W⊗n(T nW,δ(xn)|xn) ≥ 1− 2−nc
′δ2
holds with c′ = c2 .
Proof. Standard Bernstein-Sanov trick using the properties of types from [12] and Pinsker’s inequality. The
details can be found in [13] and references therein for example.
Recall that for p ∈ P(A) and W : A → P(B), pW ∈ P(B) denotes the output distribution generated by
p and W and that xn ∈ T np,δ and yn ∈ T nW,δ(xn) imply that yn ∈ T npW,2|A|δ.
Lemma 3.2. Let xn ∈ T np,δ, then for V : A→ P(C)
|T npV,2|A|δ| ≤ α−1
V n(zn|xn) ≤ β for all zn ∈ T nV,δ(xn)
6hold where
α = 2−n(H(pV )+f1(δ)) (8)
β = 2−n(H(V |p)−f2(δ)) (9)
with universal f1(δ), f2(δ) > 0 satisfying limδ→0 f1(δ) = 0 = limδ→0 f2(δ).
Proof. Cf. [12].
In addition we need a further lemma which will be used to determine the rates at which reliable transmission
to the legitimate receiver is possible.
Lemma 3.3. Let p, p˜ ∈ P(A) and two stochastic matrices W, W˜ : A→ P(B) be given. Further let q ∈ P(B)
be the output distribution generated by p and W . Fix δ ∈ (0, 14|A||B|). Then for every n ∈ N
q⊗n(T n
W˜ ,δ
(x˜n)) ≤ (n+ 1)|A||B|2−n(I(p˜,W˜ )−f(δ))
for all x˜n ∈ T np˜,δ holds for a universal f(δ) > 0 and limδ→0 f(δ) = 0.
Proof. The proof can be found in [13] but is given here for the sake of completeness. Let x˜n ∈ T np˜,δ and
yn ∈ T n
W˜ ,δ
(x˜n). Then with the empirical distribution pyn(b) =
N(b|yn)
n
, b ∈ B it follows by Lemma 2.6 in
[12] that
qn(yn) = 2−n(D(pyn ||q)+H(pyn )) ≤ 2−nH(pyn ),
where the inequality holds, sinceD(pyn ||q) ≥ 0. By Lemma 2.10 in [12], because x˜n ∈ T np˜,δ and yn ∈ T nW˜ ,δ(x˜
n),
it follows that yn ∈ T nq˜,2|X|δ, where q˜ is the output distribution generated by p˜ and W˜ , and thus∑
b∈B
|pyn(b)− q˜(b)| ≤ 2|A||B|δ
By the continuity of the entropy function it follows by 2.7 in [12] that
|H(pyn)−H(q˜)| ≤ −2|A||B|δ log 2|A||B|δ|B| =: ϕ(δ)
with limδ→0 ϕ(δ) = 0. By the last two inequalities we obtain that
qn(T n
W˜ ,δ
(x˜n)) ≤ |T n
W˜ ,δ
(x˜n)|2−n(H(q˜)−ϕ(δ)). (10)
By the proof of Lemma 2.13 it follows that
|T n
W˜ ,δ
(x˜n)| ≤ (n+ 1)|A||B|2n(H(W˜ |p˜)+ψ(δ))
with ψ(δ) > 0 and limδ→0 ψ(δ) = 0. Then from (10) by defining f(δ) := ϕ(δ) + ψ(δ) we end up with
qn(T n
W˜ ,δ
(x˜n)) ≤ (n+ 1)|A||B|2−n(I(p˜,W˜ )−f(δ))
The assertion still holds if we replace W˜ by W and p˜ by p throughout the proof.
The last lemma is a standard result from large deviation theory.
Lemma 3.4. (Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds) Let Z1, . . . , ZL be i.i.d. random variables with values in [0, 1] and
expectation EZi = µ, and 0 < ǫ <
1
2 . Then it follows that
Pr
{
1
L
L∑
i=1
Zi /∈ [(1 ± ǫ)µ]
}
≤ 2 exp
(
−L · ǫ
2µ
3
)
,
where [(1 ± ǫ)µ] denotes the interval [(1− ǫ)µ, (1 + ǫ)µ].
Proof. The proof is given in [14] (cf. Theorem 1.1) and in [15].
73.2. CSI at the transmitter
First we consider the case in which the transmitter has full knowledge of the channel state (CSI) while
the legitimate receiver has no information about the channel state. The main result in this section is the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.5. The secrecy capacity of the compound wiretap channel W with CSI at the transmitter is
given by
CS,CSI(W) = min
t∈θ
max
Ut→Xt→(Y Z)t
(I(Ut, Yt)− I(Ut, Zt)).
Here Xt is a random variable with probability distribution in P(A) and Ut is an auxiliary random variable
with range equals A, such that Ut, Xt, (Y Z)t form a Markov chain Ut → Xt → (Y Z)t in this order. Then
the maximum refers to all random variables satisfying the Markov chain condition such that Xt is connected
with Yt respective Zt by the channels Wt respective Vt for every t ∈ θ.
Notice first that the inequality
CS,CSI(W) ≤ min
t∈θ
max
Ut→Xt→(Y Z)t
(I(Ut, Yt)− I(Ut, Zt))
is trivially true since we cannot exceed the secrecy capacity of the worst wiretap channel in the family W.
This has been already pointed out in [1]. The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of the achievability.
Proof. It suffices to prove that mint∈Θ(I(Xt, Yt)− I(Xt, Zt)) for (XY Z)t as above is an achievable secrecy
rate. Then we will have shown that R = mint∈Θ(I(Ut, Yt) − I(Ut, Zt)), with Ut → Xt → (Y Z)t form a
Markov chain, is an achievable secrecy rate (cf. [12] page 411). We choose p1, . . . , pT ∈ P(A) and define new
probability distributions on An by
p′t(x
n) :=
{
p⊗nt (x
n)
p⊗nt (T
n
pt,δ
)
if xn ∈ T npt,δ,
0 otherwise,
. (11)
Define then for zn ∈ Cn, xn ∈ An
Q˜t,xn(z
n) = V nt (z
n|xn) · 1T n
Vt,δ
(xn)(z
n)
on Cn. Additionally, we set for zn ∈ Cn
Θ′t(z
n) =
∑
xn∈T n
pt,δ
p′t(x
n)Q˜t,xn(z
n). (12)
Now let S := {zn ∈ Cn : Θ′t(zn) ≥ ǫαt} where ǫ = 2−nc
′δ2 (cf. Lemma 3.1) and αt is from (8) in Lemma 3.2
computed with respect to pt and Vt. By lemma 3.2 the support of Θ
′
t has cardinality ≤ α−1t since for each
xn ∈ T npt,δ it holds that T nVt,δ(xn) ⊂ T nptVt,2|A|δ, which implies that
∑
zn∈S Θt(z
n) ≥ 1− 2ǫ, if
Θt(z
n) = Θ′t(z
n) · 1S(zn) and
Qt,xn(z
n) = Q˜t,xn(z
n) · 1S(zn). (13)
Now for each t ∈ θ define Jn ·Ln,t i.i.d. random variables X(t)jl with j ∈ [Jn] := {1, . . . , Jn} and l ∈ [Ln,t] :=
{1, . . . , Ln,t} each of them distributed according to p′t with
Jn =
⌊
2n[mint∈θ(I(pt,Wt)−I(pt,Vt))−τ ]
⌋
(14)
Ln,t =
⌊
2n[I(pt,Vt)+
τ
4 ]
⌋
(15)
for τ > 0. Moreover we suppose that the random matrices {X(t)j,l }j∈[Jn],l∈[Ln,l] and {X(t
′)
j,l }j∈[Jn],l∈[Ln,l] are
independent for t 6= t′. Now it is obvious from (12) and the definition of the set S that for any zn ∈ S
8Θt(z
n) = EQ
t,X
(t)
jl
(zn) ≥ ǫαt if E is the expectation value with respect to the distribution p′t. For the random
variables β−1t Qt,X(t)
jl
(zn) define the event
ιj(t) =
⋂
zn∈Cn
 1Ln,t
Ln,t∑
l=1
Q
t,X
(t)
jl
(zn) ∈ [(1± ǫ)Θt(zn)]
 , (16)
and keeping in mind that Θt(z
n) ≥ ǫαt for all zn ∈ S it follows that for all j ∈ [Jn] and for all t ∈ θ
Pr{(ιj(t))c} ≤ 2|C|n exp
(
− Ln,t 2
−n[I(pt,Vt)+g(δ)]
3
)
(17)
by Lemma 3.4, Lemma 3.2, and our choice ǫ = 2−nc
′δ2 with g(δ) := f1(δ) + f2(δ) + 3c
′δ2. Making δ > 0
sufficiently small we have for all sufficiently large n ∈ N
Ln,t2
−n[I(pt,Vt)+g(δ)] ≥ 2n τ8 .
Thus, for this choice of δ the RHS of (17) is double exponential in n uniformly in t ∈ θ and can be made
smaller than ǫJ−1n for all j ∈ [Jn] and all sufficiently large n ∈ N. I.e.
Pr{(ιj(t))c} ≤ ǫJ−1n ∀t ∈ θ. (18)
Let us turn now to the coding part of the problem. Let p′t ∈ P(An) be given as in (11). We abbreviate
X := {X(t)}t∈θ for the family of random matrices X(t) = {X(t)jl }j∈[Jn],l∈[Ln,t] whose components are i.i.d.
according to p′t. We will show now how the reliable transmission of the message j ∈ [Jn] can be achieved
when randomising over the index l ∈ Ln,t without any attempt to decode the randomisation parameter at
the legitimate receiver (see section 4.1). To this end let us define for each j ∈ [Jn] a random set
D′j(X ) :=
⋃
s∈θ
⋃
k∈[Ln,s]
T nWs,δ(X
(s)
jk ),
and the subordinate random decoder {Dj(X )}j∈[Jn] ⊆ Bn is given by
Dj(X ) := D′j(X ) ∩
( ⋃
j′∈[Jn]
j′ 6=j
D′j′ (X )
)c
. (19)
Consequently we can define the random average probabilities of error for a specific channel t ∈ θ by
λ(t)n (X ) :=
1
Jn
∑
j∈[Jn]
1
Ln,t
∑
l∈[Ln,t]
W⊗nt ((Dj(X ))c|X(t)jl ). (20)
Now (19) implies for each t ∈ θ and l ∈ [Ln,t]
W⊗nt ((Dj(X ))c|X(t)jl )
≤W⊗nt (
⋂
s∈θ
⋂
k∈[Ln,s]
(T nWs,δ(X
(s)
jk ))
c|X(t)jl ) +
∑
j′∈[Jn]
j′ 6=j
∑
s∈θ
∑
k∈[Ln,s]
W⊗nt (T nWs,δ(X
(s)
j′k)|X(t)jl )
≤W⊗nt ((T ⊗nWt,δ(X
(t)
jl ))
c|X(t)jl ) +
∑
j′∈[Jn]
j′ 6=j
∑
s∈θ
∑
k∈[Ln,s]
W⊗nt (T nWs,δ(X
(s)
j′k)|X(t)jl ),
(21)
where the second inequality follows by the monotonicity of the probability. By Lemma 3.1 and the indepen-
dence of all involved random variables we obtain
EX (W
⊗n
t ((Dj(X ))c|X(t)jl ))
≤ (n+ 1)|A||B| · 2−ncδ2
+
∑
j′∈[Jn]
j′ 6=j
∑
s∈θ
∑
k∈[Ln,s]
E
X
(s)
j′k
E
X
(t)
jl
W⊗nt (T nWs,δ(X
(s)
j′k)|X(t)jl ).
(22)
9We shall find now for j′ 6= j an upper bound on
E
X
(t)
jl
W⊗nt (T nWs,δ(X
(s)
j′k)|X(t)jl )
=
∑
xn∈An
p′t(x
n)W⊗nt (T nWs,δ(X
(s)
j′k)|xn)
≤
∑
xn∈An
p⊗nt (x
n)
p⊗nt (T npt,δ)
W⊗nt (T nWs,δ(X
(s)
j′k)|xn)
=
q⊗nt (T nWs,δ(X
(s)
j′k))
p⊗nt (T npt,δ)
.
(23)
By Lemma 3.1 and by Lemma 3.3 for any t, s ∈ θ we have
p⊗nt (T npt,δ) ≥ 1− (n+ 1)|A| · 2−ncδ
2
q⊗nt (T nWs,δ(X
(s)
j′k)) ≤ (n+ 1)|A||B| · 2−n(I(ps,Ws)−f(δ))
(24)
with a universal f(δ) > 0 satisfying limδ→0 f(δ) = 0 since X
(s)
j′k ∈ T nps,δ with probability 1. Thus inserting
this into (23) we obtain
E
X
(t)
jl
W⊗nt (T nWs,δ(X
(s)
j′k)|X(t)jl ) ≤
(n+ 1)|A||B|
1− (n+ 1)|A| · 2−ncδ2 · 2
−n(I(ps,Ws)−f(δ))
for all s, t ∈ θ, all j′ 6= j, and all l ∈ [Ln,t], k ∈ [Ln,s]. Now by defining νn(δ) := (n + 1)|A||B| · 2−ncδ2 and
µn(δ) := 1− (n+ 1)|A| · 2−ncδ2 thus for each t ∈ θ, l ∈ [Ln,t], and j ∈ [Jn] (22) and (23) lead to
EX (W
⊗n
t ((Dj(X ))c|X(t)jl ))
≤ νn(δ) + (n+ 1)
|A||B|
µn(δ)
Jn
∑
s∈θ
Ln,s2
−n(I(ps,Ws)−f(δ))
≤ νn(δ) + (n+ 1)
|A||B|
µn(δ)
Jn
∑
s∈θ
2−n(I(ps,Ws)−I(ps,Vs)−f(δ)−
τ
4 )
≤ νn(δ) + (n+ 1)
|A||B|
µn(δ)
T · Jn · 2−n(mins∈θ(I(ps,Ws)−I(ps,Vs))−f(δ)− τ4 )
≤ νn(δ) + (n+ 1)
|A||B|
µn(δ)
T · 2−n(τ−f(δ)− τ4 )
≤ νn(δ) + (n+ 1)
|A||B|
µn(δ)
T · 2−n τ2
(25)
where we have used (15), (14), and we have chosen δ > 0 small enough to ensure that τ − f(δ) − τ4 ≥ τ2 .
Defining a = a(δ, τ) :=
min{cδ2, τ4 }
2 we can find n(δ, τ, |A|, |B|) ∈ N such that for all n ≥ n(δ, τ, |A|, |B|)
EX (W
⊗n
t ((Dj(X ))c|X(t)jl )) ≤ T · 2−na
holds for all t ∈ θ, l ∈ [Ln,t], and j ∈ [Jn]. Consequently, for any t ∈ θ we obtain
EX (λ
(t)
n (X )) ≤ T · 2−na.
Additionally we define for any t ∈ θ an event
ι0(t) = {λ(t)n (X ) ≤
√
T2−n
a
2 }. (26)
Then using the Markov inequality applied to λ
(t)
n (X ) along with (26), we obtain that
Pr{(ι0(t))c} ≤
√
T2−n
a
2 . (27)
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Set
ι :=
⋂
t∈θ
Jn⋂
k=0
ιk(t) (28)
Then with (18), (27), and applying the union bound we obtain
Pr{ιc} ≤
∑
t∈θ
Jn∑
k=0
Pr{(ιk(t))c} ≤ T · ǫ+ T 32 · 2−na2
≤ T 2 · 2−nc′′
for a suitable positive constant c′′ > 0 and all sufficiently large n ∈ N.
Hence, we have shown that for each t ∈ θ there exist realisations {(x(t)jl )j∈[Jn],l∈[Ln,t] : t ∈ θ} ∈ ι of X . Now,
denoting by ‖ · ‖ the variational distance
||p− q|| :=
∑
x∈A
|p(x)− q(x)|
for p, q ∈ A, we show that the secrecy level is fulfilled uniformly in t ∈ θ for any particular {(x(t)jl )j∈[Jn],l∈[Ln,t] :
t ∈ θ} ∈ ι .∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1Ln,t
Ln,t∑
l=1
V nt (·|x(t)jl )−Θt(·)
∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ 1Ln,t
Ln,t∑
l=1
∥∥∥V nt (·|x(t)jl )− Q˜t,x(t)
jl
(·)
∥∥∥+
+
∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1Ln,t
Ln,t∑
l=1
(
Q˜
t,x
(t)
jl
(·)−Q
t,x
(t)
jl
(·))
∥∥∥∥∥∥+
∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1Ln,t
Ln,t∑
l=1
Q
t,x
(t)
jl
(·) −Θt(·)
∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ 5ǫ.
(29)
In the first term the functions V nt (·|x(t)jl ) and Q˜t,x(t)
jl
(·) differ if zn /∈ T nptVt,2|A|δ, so it makes a contribution of ǫ
to the bound. In the second term Q˜t and Qt are different for z
n /∈ S and because ιj(t) and
∑
zn∈S Θt(z
n) ≥
1− 2ǫ imply that
1
Ln,t
Ln,t∑
l=1
∑
zn∈S
Q
t,x
(t)
jl
(zn) ≥ 1− 3ǫ,
the second term is bounded by 3ǫ. The third term is bounded by ǫ which follows directly from (16).
For any {(x(t)jl )j∈[Jn],l∈[Ln,t] : t ∈ θ} ∈ ι with the corresponding decoding sets {Dj : j ∈ [Jn]} it follows by
construction that
1
Jn
∑
j∈[Jn]
1
Ln,t
∑
l∈[Ln,t]
W⊗nt (D
c
j |x(t)jl ) ≤
√
T · 2−na′ (30)
is fulfilled for all t ∈ θ with a′ > 0, which means that we have found a (n, Jn) code with average error
probability tending to zero for n ∈ N sufficiently large for any channel realisation. Now by a standard
expurgation scheme we show that this still holds for the maximum error probability. We define the set
Gt := {j ∈ Jn : 1
Ln,t
∑
l∈[Ln,t]
W⊗nt (D
c
j |x(t)jl ) ≤
√
η} (31)
with η :=
√
T ·2−na′ and denote its complement asBt := Gct and the union of all complements asB =
⋃
t∈θ Bt.
Then (30) and (31) imply that
η ≥ 1
Jn
∑
j∈[Jn]
1
Ln,t
∑
l∈[Ln,t]
W⊗nt (D
c
j |x(t)jl ) ≥
|Bt|
Jn
√
η
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for all t ∈ θ and by the union bound it follows that
|B| ≤
∑
t∈θ
|Bt| ≤ T · √η · Jn.
After removing all j ∈ B (which are at most a fraction of T 54 2−na′2 of Jn) and relabeling we obtain a new
(n, J˜n) code (Ej , Dj)j∈[J˜n] without changing the rate. The maximum error probability of the new code
fulfills for sufficiently large n ∈ N
max
t∈θ
max
j∈[J˜n]
1
Ln,t
∑
l∈[Ln,t]
W⊗nt (D
c
j |x(t)jl ) ≤ T
1
4 · 2−na
′
2 .
On the other hand, if we set
Vˆ nt (z
n|(j, l)) := V nt (zn|x(t)jl ) (32)
and further define
Vˆ nt,j(z
n) =
1
Ln,t
Ln,t∑
l=1
Vˆ nt (z
n|(j, l)) , (33)
V¯ nt (z
n) =
1
J˜n
J˜n∑
j=1
Vˆ nt,j(z
n), (34)
we obtain that
‖Vˆ nt,j − V¯ nt ‖ ≤ ‖Vˆ nt,j −Θt‖+ ‖Θt − V¯ nt ‖
≤ 10ǫ,
for all j ∈ [J˜n], t ∈ θ with ǫ = 2−nc′δ2 where we have used the convexity of the variational distance and
(29) which still applies by our expurgation procedure. For a uniformly distributed random variable J taking
values in the set {1, . . . , J˜n} we obtain with Lemma 2.7 of [12] (uniform continuity of the entropy function)
I(J ;Znt ) =
Jn∑
j=1
1
J˜n
(H(V¯ nt )−H(Vˆ nt,j))
= H(Znt )−H(Znt |J)
≤ −10ǫ log(10ǫ) + 10nǫ log |C|
uniformly in t ∈ θ (for 10ǫ ≤ e−1). Hence the strong secrecy level of the definition 2.1 holds uniformly in
t ∈ θ. Using standard arguments (cf. [12] page 411) we then have shown the achievability of the secrecy rate
RS = min
t∈θ
max
Ut→Xt→(Y Z)t
(I(Ut, Yt)− I(Ut, Zt)). (35)
Remark. Note that in the case that W := {Wt, Vs : t = 1, . . . T, s = 1, . . . S} with S 6= T and the pair (s, t)
known to the transmitter prior to transmission nothing new happens. A slight modification of the arguments
presented above shows that
CS,CSI(W) = min
(t,s)
max
U→X→(YtZs)
(I(U, Yt)− I(U,Zs)).
3.3. No CSI
In the previous section we have assumed that the channel state is known to the transmitter. We now
consider the case where neither the transmitter nor the receiver has knowledge of the channel state. We will
prove that
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Theorem 3.6. For the secrecy capacity CS(W) of the compound wiretap channel W without CSI it holds
that
CS(W) ≥ max
p∈P(A)
(min
t∈θ
I(p,Wt)−max
t∈θ
I(p, Vt)).
Proof. Caused by the lack of channel knowledge we use a stochastic encoder independent of the channel
realisation. For any p ∈ P(A) let p′ ∈ P(An) be the distribution given by
p′(xn) :=
{
p⊗n(xn)
p⊗n(T n
p,δ
) if x
n ∈ T np,δ,
0 otherwise.
Then analogously to the case with CSI we define Q˜t,xn(z
n), Qt,xn(z
n), and Θ′t(z
n),Θt(z
n) for zn ∈ Cn but
now with respect to the distribution p′. Consequently, Θ′(·) has support only on T npVt,2|A|δ, and Qt,xn(·) and
Θ(·) only on the set S. Furthermore Θ(zn) ≥ ǫαt for all zn ∈ S. Now define Jn · Ln i.i.d random variables
Xjl according to the distribution p
′ independent of t ∈ θ with j ∈ [Jn] and l ∈ [Ln] with
Jn = ⌊2n[mint I(p,Wt)−maxt I(p,Vt)−τ ]⌋ (36)
Ln = ⌊2n[maxt I(p,Vt)+ τ4 ]⌋ (37)
for τ > 0. Now because Θt(z
n) = EQt,Xjl ≥ ǫαt for all zn ∈ S we define the event ιj(t) as in (16) for the
random variables β−1t Qt,Xjl
ιj(t) =
⋂
zn∈Cn
{
1
Ln
Ln∑
l=1
Qt,Xjl(z
n) ∈ [(1± ǫ)Θt(zn)]
}
,
but considering the difference that the random variables Xjl are independent of the channel state. Then
analogously to (17) we obtain that
Pr{(ιj(t))c} ≤ 2|C|n exp
(
− Ln 2
−n(I(p,Vt)+g(δ))
3
)
by Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.2. Notice that, because the sender does not know which channel is used, we
need the maximum in the definition of Ln. Thus the right-hand side is a double exponential in n and can
be made smaller than ǫJ−1n for all j and for all t ∈ θ and sufficiently large n.
Now let Jn and Ln be defined as stated above, and let X
n = {Xjl}j∈[Jn],l∈[Ln] be the set of i.i.d. random
variables each of them distributed according to p′ independent of t ∈ θ. As in the case of CSI we can show
that reliable transmission of the message j ∈ [Jn] can be achieved. To this end define now the random
decoder {Dj(Xn)}j∈[Jn] ⊆ Bn as in (19) but with
D′j(X
n) :=
⋃
s∈θ
⋃
k∈[Ln]
T nWs,δ(Xjk),
and the random average probabilities of error for a specific channel λ
(t)
n (Xn) as in (20). Notice that now
both Xn and Ln do not depend on t ∈ θ and this holds throughout the entire proof. Then we can give the
bound in (21) now by
W⊗nt ((Dj(X
n))c|Xjl)
≤W⊗nt ((T ⊗nWt,δ(Xjl))c|Xjl) +
∑
j′∈[Jn]
j′ 6=j
∑
s∈θ
∑
k∈[Ln]
W⊗nt (T nWs,δ(Xj′k)|Xjl)
We can bound the first term in the inequality by νn(δ) := (n+1)
|A||B| · 2−ncδ2 (see (22)). If we average over
all codebooks we get
EXn(W
⊗n
t ((Dj(X
n))c|Xjl))
≤ νn(δ) +
∑
j′∈[Jn]
j′ 6=j
∑
s∈θ
∑
k∈[Ln]
EXj′kEXjlW
⊗n
t (θ
n
Ws,δ
(Xj′k)|Xjl).
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By the same reasoning as in (23) and (24) we can give an upper bound on
EXjlW
⊗n
t (T nWs,δ(Xj′k)|Xjl)
≤ q
⊗n
t (T nWs,δ(Xj′k))
p⊗n(T np,δ)
≤ (n+ 1)
|A||B|
1− (n+ 1)|A| · 2−ncδ2 · 2
−n(I(p,Ws)−f(δ))
for all t ∈ θ, all j′ 6= j and all k, l ∈ [Ln] with a universal f(δ) > 0 satisfying limδ→0 f(δ) = 0. q⊗nt
denotes the output distribution generated by the conditional distribution W⊗nt and the input distribution
p⊗n. Additionally we define µn(δ) := 1− (n+ 1)|A| · 2−ncδ2 . Then (25) changes to
EXn(W
⊗n
t ((Dj(X
n))c|Xjl))
≤ νn(δ) + (n+ 1)
|A||B|
µn(δ)
T · JnLn · 2−n(mins I(p,Ws)−f(δ))
≤ νn(δ) + T · 2−n τ2
by the definition of Jn and Ln in (36), (37) and by choosing δ > 0 small enough that τ − τ4 − f(δ) ≥ τ2 .
Now by defining a :=
min{cδ2, τ2 }
2 and the definition of the error probability the last inequality results in the
upper bound
EXn(λ
(t)
n (X
n)) ≤ T · 2−na
for any t ∈ θ and n ∈ N large enough.
Now we define the event ι0(t) for any t ∈ θ and the event ι as in (26) and (28) but with the difference that
the input is independent of the channel realisation. So by the same reasoning we end in
Pr{ιc} ≤ T 2 · 2−nc′′
for a constant c′′ > 0 and all sufficiently large n ∈ N, which implies that there exist realisations {xjl} of
{Xjl} such that xjl ∈ ι for all j ∈ [Jn] and l ∈ [Ln]. Then analogously to (29) we get for any channel t ∈ θ∥∥∥∥∥ 1Ln
Ln∑
l=1
V nt (·|xjl)−Θt(·)
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ 5ǫ
differs from the former only by Ln in place of Ln,t. Hence, following the same arguments subsequent to (30),
we have shown that there is a sequence of (n, J˜n) codes for which
max
t∈θ
max
j∈[J˜n]
1
Ln
∑
l∈[Ln]
W⊗nt (D
c
j |xjl) ≤ T
1
4 · 2−n a
′
2
holds for sufficiently large n ∈ N, and the strong secrecy level is fulfilled for every channel t ∈ θ by
‖Vˆ nt,j − V¯ nt ‖ ≤ 6ǫ
(Vˆ nt,j , V¯
n
t defined as in (33), (34)) and thus by
I(J ;Znt ) ≤ −10ǫ log(10ǫ) + 10nǫ log |C|
which tends to zero for n→∞ uniformly in t ∈ θ.
We turn now to the converse of Theorem 3.6. Actually, we give only a multiletter formula of the upper
bound of the secrecy rates. First we need the following lemma.
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Lemma 3.7. Let W = {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} be an arbitrary compound wiretap channel without CSI. Then
lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U→Xn→Y nt Z
n
t
(inf
t∈θ
I(U ;Y nt )− sup
t∈θ
I(U ;Znt ))
exists and we have
lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U→Xn→Y nt Z
n
t
(inf
t∈θ
I(U ;Y nt )− sup
t∈θ
I(U ;Znt ))
= sup
n∈N
1
n
max
U→Xn→Y nt Z
n
t
(inf
t∈θ
I(U ;Y nt )− sup
t∈θ
I(U ;Znt )).
Proof. The proof is based on Fekete’s lemma [16]. Consequently, if we apply the lemma to the sequence
(an)n∈N defined by
an := max
U→Xn→Y nt Z
n
t
(inf
t∈θ
I(U ;Y nt )− sup
t∈θ
I(U ;Znt ))
it suffices to show that the inequality
an+m ≥ an + am
holds for all n,m ∈ N. This will be done by considering two independent Markov chains U1 → Xn →
(Y nt , Z
n
t ) and U2 → Xˆm → (Yˆ mt , Zˆmt ) and setting U := (U1, U2), Xn+m := (Xn, Xˆm), and (Y n+mt , Zn+mt ) :=
((Y nt , Yˆ
m
t ), (Z
n
t , Zˆ
m
t )). Then by the definition of an
an+m ≥ inf
t∈θ
I(U ;Y n+mt )− sup
t∈θ
I(U ;Zn+mt )
≥ inf
t∈θ
I(U1;Y
n
t ) + inf
t∈θ
I(U2; Yˆ
m
t )− sup
t∈θ
I(U1;Z
n
t )− sup
t∈θ
I(U2; Zˆ
m
t ).
By the independence of the two Markov chains mentioned above and because apart from that these Markov
chains were arbitrary we can conclude that
an+m ≥ an + am
holds for all n,m ∈ N.
Proposition 3.8. The secrecy capacity of the compound wiretap channel in the case of no CSI CS(W) is
upper bounded by
CS(W) ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U→Xn→Y nt Z
n
t
(inf
t∈θ
I(U ;Y nt )− sup
t∈θ
I(U ;Znt )).
Proof. Let (Cn)n∈N be any sequence of (n, Jn) codes such that with
sup
t∈θ
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)W⊗nt (Dcj |xn) =: ε1,n, (38)
and
sup
t∈θ
I(J ;Znt ) =: ε2,n
it holds that limn→∞ ε1,n = 0 and limn→∞ ε2,n = 0, where J denotes the random variable which is uniformly
distributed on the message set {1, . . . , Jn}. Let us denote by Jˆ the random variable with values in {1, . . . , Jn}
determined by the Markov chain J → Xn → Y nt → Jˆ where the first transition is governed by E, the second
by W⊗nt , and the last by the decoding rule. Then we have for any t ∈ θ
log Jn = H(J) = I(J ; Jˆ) +H(J |Jˆ)
≤ I(J ;Y nt ) +H(J |Jˆ), (39)
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where the inequality follows from the data processing inequality. Then using Fano’s inequality we find that
H(J |Jˆ) ≤ 1 + ε1,n log Jn
with (38). Thus we can rewrite inequality (39) as
(1− ε1,n) log Jn ≤ I(J ;Y nt ) + 1
for all t ∈ θ. On the other hand we have for every t ∈ θ
I(J ;Y nt ) = I(J ;Y
n
t )− sup
t∈θ
I(J ;Znt ) + ε2,n
where we have used the validity of the secrecy criterion stated above. Then the last two inequalities imply
that for any t ∈ θ
(1− ε1,n) log Jn ≤ I(J ;Y nt )− sup
t∈θ
I(J ;Znt ) + ε2,n. (40)
Since the LHS of (40) does not depend on t we arrive at
(1− ε1,n) log Jn ≤ max
U→Xn→Y nt Z
n
t
(inf
t∈θ
I(U ;Y nt )− sup
t∈θ
I(U ;Znt )) + ε2,n,
which concludes the proof after dividing by n ∈ N, taking lim sup and taking into account the assertion of
Lemma 3.7.
Remark. Following the same arguments subsequent to (35) concerning the use of the channels defined by
PYt|T = Wt · PX|T and PZt|T = Vt · PX|T instead of Wt and Vt and applying the assertion of Theorem 3.6
to the n-fold product of channels Wt and Vt, we can give the coding theorem for the multiletter case. The
capacity of the compound wiretap channel in the case of no CSI is
CS(W) = lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U→Xn→Y nt Z
n
t
(inf
t∈θ
I(U ;Y nt )− sup
t∈θ
I(U ;Znt )).
Let us consider now the case W := {Wt, Vs : t = 1, . . . T, s = 1, . . . S} with S 6= T and the pair (s, t)
unknown to both the transmitter and the legitimate receiver. Additionally we assume that each Vs is a
degraded version of every Wt, which is characterised by
Vs(z|x) =
∑
y∈B
Wt(y|x)D(t,s)(z|y), (41)
for all x ∈ A, z ∈ C, if D is defined as the stochastic matrix D : B → P(C). Then we have the following
Lemma 3.9. Let p ∈ P(A), W : A → P(B), V : A → P(C), and assume that V is a degraded version of
W . Then I(X ;Y |Z) is a concave with respect to the input distribution pX = p.
Proof. Let X,Y, Z be random variables with values in A,B,C respectively distributed according to
Pr(X = x, Y = y, Z = z) := pXY Z(x, y, z) = p(x)W (y|x)D(z|y) (42)
for all x ∈ A, y ∈ B, z ∈ Z. Because
I(X ;Y |Z) = H(Y |Z)−H(Y |X,Z)
the proof is based on the two assertions
1. H(Y |Z) depends concavely on pX , and
2. H(Y |X,Z) is an affine function of pX .
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First, H(Y |Z) is a concave function with respect to pY Z by the log-sum inequality (cf. [12] Lemma 3.1).
Then because pXY Z depends affinely on pX by (42), so does pY Z , and the first assertion follows. For the
second consider that (41) and (42) imply that
pY |X,Z(y|x, z) =
W (y|x)D(z|y)
V (z|x)
for every input distribution pX , any y ∈ B and all x ∈ A, z ∈ C with pXZ(x, z) > 0. Then we have
H(Y |X,Z) =
∑
x∈A,z∈C
pXZ(x, z)H
(
W (·|x)D(z|·)
V (z|x)
)
showing that H(Y |X,Z) is an affine function of pXZ which in turn depends affinely on pX .
Now because the random variables X,Yt, Zs (Yt, Zs the channel outputs of Wt and Vs resp.) form a
Markov chain for all t ∈ θ and s ∈ S, we obtain that
I(X ;Yt|Zs) = I(X,Yt)− I(X,Zs). (43)
By virtue of Theorem 2 of [17] we can show that for the secrecy rate it holds that
RS ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Yi,t|Zi,s) + ǫ′
for any channel (t, s) ∈ θ×S and ǫ′ > 0. The concavity of I(X ;Yt|Zs) with respect to the input distributions
p ∈ P(A) together with (43) then imply the converse part of Theorem 3.6, that
RS ≤ max
p∈P(A)
min
(t,s)
(I(p,Wt)− I(p, Vs)).
Now we can state the following
Proposition 3.10. If Vs is a degraded version of Wt for all s ∈ S and t ∈ θ the capacity of the compound
wiretap channel is given by
CS(W) = max
p∈P(A)
min
(t,s)
(I(p,Wt)− I(p, Vs))
= max
p∈P(A)
(min
t
I(p,Wt)−max
s
I(p, Vs)).
Remark. This result was obtained in [1] with a weaker notion of secrecy.
3.4. Channel state to the legitimate receiver is known at the transmitter (CSIt)
We now consider the case, in which the transmitter has knowledge of the channel state to the legitimate
receiver t ∈ θ but the channel state to the eavesdropper s ∈ S is unknown. We will denote this kind
of channel state information by CSIt. Consequently we get for each t ∈ θ possible channel realisations
Wt := {(Wt, Vs) : s = 1, . . . S}. Then we can describe the compound channel as W = ∪t∈θWt.
Theorem 3.11. For the secrecy capacity CS,CSIt(W) of the compound wiretap channel with CSIt it holds
that
CS,CSIt(W) ≥ min
t∈θ
max
p∈P(A)
(I(p,Wt)−max
s∈S
I(p, Vs)).
Proof. Adapted to the channel realisation Wt define
p′t(x
n) :=
{
p⊗nt (x
n)
p⊗nt (T
n
pt,δ
)
if xn ∈ T npt,δ,
0 otherwise.
(44)
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for arbitrary input distributions p1, . . . , pT ∈ P(A). Now define for zn ∈ Cn and s ∈ S
Q˜s,xn(z
n) = V ns (z
n|xn) · 1T n
Vs,δ
(xn)(z
n)
on Cn. Additionally, we set for zn ∈ Cn
Θ′s(z
n) =
∑
xn∈T n
pt,δ
p′t(x
n)Q˜s,xn(z
n).
Now let S := {zn ∈ Cn : Θ′s(zn) ≥ ǫαt,s} where ǫ = 2−nc
′δ2 and αt,s is from (8) similar to the former cases
but computed with respect to pt and Vs. Then the support of Θ
′
s has cardinality ≤ α−1t,s , which implies that∑
zn∈S Θs(z
n) ≥ 1− 2ǫ. Analogously to (13) define Θs(zn) and Qs,xn(zn) with support on S and further
Jn = ⌊2n[mint(I(pt,Wt)−maxs I(pt,Vs))−τ ]⌋ (45)
Ln,t = ⌊2n[maxs I(pt,Vs)+ τ4 ]⌋. (46)
As in the case of CSI define random matrices {X(t)jl }j∈[Jn],l∈[Ln,t] such that the random variables X(t)jl where
i.i.d. according to p′t. We suppose additionally that {X(t)jl }j,l and {X(t
′)
jl }j,l are independent for t 6= t′. For
any zn ∈ S it follows that Θs(zn) = EQs,X(t)
jl
(zn) ≥ ǫαt,s, if E is the expectation value with respect to the
distribution p′t. For the random variables β
−1
t,sQs,X(t)
jl
(zn) define the event
ιj(s, t) =
⋂
zn∈Cn
 1Ln,t
Ln,t∑
l=1
Q
s,X
(t)
jl
(zn) ∈ [(1± ǫ)Θs(zn)]
 .
Then it follows that for all j ∈ [Jn] and for all s ∈ S it holds for each t ∈ θ
Pr{(ιj(s, t))c} ≤ 2|C|n exp
(
− Ln,t 2
−n[I(pt,Vs)+g(δ)]
3
)
by Lemma 3.4, Lemma 3.2, Thus the RHS is double exponential in n uniformly in s ∈ S, t ∈ θ (guaranteed
by the maximum in s in the definition of Ln,t) and can be made smaller than ǫJ
−1
n for all j ∈ [Jn] and all
sufficiently large n. Now the coding part of the problem is similar to the case with CSI. Let p′t ∈ P(An) be
given as in (44). We abbreviate X := {X(t)}t∈θ for the family of random matrices X(t) = {X(t)jl }j∈[Jn],l∈[Ln,t]
whose components are i.i.d. according to p′t. We will show how reliable transmission of the message j ∈ [Jn]
can be achieved. To this end define now the random decoder {Dj(X )}j∈[Jn] ⊆ Bn as in (19) and with
D′j(X ) :=
⋃
r∈θ
⋃
k∈[Ln,r]
T nWr ,δ(X
(r)
jk ),
and the random average probabilities of error for a specific channel λ
(t)
n (X ) as in (20) by
λ(t)n (X ) :=
1
Jn
∑
j∈[Jn]
1
Ln,t
∑
l∈[Ln,t]
W⊗nt ((Dj(X ))c|X(t)jl ).
As in (21) we get for each t ∈ θ and l ∈ [Ln,t]
W⊗nt ((Dj(X ))c|X(t)jl )
≤W⊗nt ((T ⊗nWt,δ(X
(t)
jl ))
c|X(t)jl ) +
∑
j′∈[Jn]
j′ 6=j
∑
r∈θ
∑
k∈[Ln,r]
W⊗nt (T nWr ,δ(X
(r)
j′k)|X(t)jl ),
Then by Lemma 3.1 we can bound the first term of the right hand side, such that together with the
independence of all involved random variables we end up with
EX (W
⊗n
t ((Dj(X ))c|X(t)jl ))
≤ (n+ 1)|A||B| · 2−ncδ2
+
∑
j′∈[Jn]
j′ 6=j
∑
r∈θ
∑
k∈[Ln,r]
E
X
(r)
j′k
E
X
(t)
jl
W⊗nt (T nWr ,δ(X
(r)
j′k)|X(t)jl ).
(47)
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We shall find now for j′ 6= j by the same reasoning as in (23) and (24) an upper bound on
E
X
(t)
jl
W⊗nt (T nWr ,δ(X
(r)
j′k)|X(t)jl )
≤ q
⊗n
t (T nWr ,δ(X
(r)
j′k))
p⊗nt (T npt,δ)
≤ (n+ 1)
|A||B|
1− (n+ 1)|A| · 2−ncδ2 · 2
−n(I(pr,Wr)−f(δ))
for all r, t ∈ θ, all j′ 6= j, and all l ∈ [Ln,t], k ∈ [Ln,r]. Now by defining νn(δ) := (n + 1)|A||B| · 2−ncδ2 and
µn(δ) := 1− (n+ 1)|A| · 2−ncδ2 thus for each t ∈ θ, l ∈ [Ln,t], and j ∈ [Jn] (47) and the last inequality leads
to
EX (W
⊗n
t ((Dj(X ))c|X(t)jl ))
≤ νn(δ) + (n+ 1)
|A||B|
µn(δ)
Jn
∑
r∈θ
Ln,r2
−n(I(pr,Wr)−f(δ))
≤ νn(δ) + (n+ 1)
|A||B|
µn(δ)
TJn · 2−n(minr∈θ(I(pr ,Wr)−maxs I(pr ,Vs))−f(δ)− τ4 )
≤ νn(δ) + (n+ 1)
|A||B|
µn(δ)
T · 2−n τ2
where we have used the definitions of Jn and Ln,r in (45), (46) and we have chosen δ > 0 small enough to
ensure that τ − f(δ)− τ4 ≥ τ2 . Defining a = a(δ, τ) :=
min{cδ2, τ2 }
2 we can find n(δ, τ, |A|, |B|) ∈ N such that
for all n ≥ n(δ, τ, |A|, |B|) we end in
EX (λ
(t)
n (X )) ≤ T · 2−na.
for any t ∈ θ. To give a bound on the average probability of error we define the event ι0(t) for any t ∈ θ as
in (26) and the event
ι :=
⋂
t∈θ
⋂
s∈S
Jn⋂
k=0
ιk(t, s)
differs from (28) only by the intersection of the unknown channel states s ∈ S. Thus we can conclude that
Pr{ιc} ≤ S · T · ǫ + S · T 32 · 2−na2
≤ S · T 2 · 2−nc′′
holds for a suitable positive constant c′′ > 0 and all sufficiently large n ∈ N, and we have shown that for
each t ∈ θ there exist realisations {(x(t)jl )j∈[Jn],l∈[Ln,t] : t ∈ θ} ∈ ι of X . By the same reasoning as in (29) we
get for any channel realisation t ∈ θ to the legitimate receiver∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1Ln,t
Ln,t∑
l=1
V ns (·|x(t)jl )−Θs(·)
∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ 5ǫ
for each of the unknown channels s ∈ S to the eavesdropper. Now, because for any t ∈ θ we have a different
codeword set {x(t)jl }, we slightly change the definition in (32) to
Vˆ n(s,t)(z
n|(j, l)) := V ns (zn|x(t)jl )
and accordingly to Vˆ n(s,t),j and V¯
n
(s,t) in (33), (34) in that way, that these distributions are defined separately
for each codeword set t ∈ θ. Thus we get, that
‖Vˆ n(s,t),j − V¯ n(s,t)‖ ≤ 10ǫ
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is fulfilled for all s ∈ S for each individual channel t ∈ θ to the legitimate receiver.
Hence, using the same expurgation scheme as in the previous sections we have shown that there is a sequence
of (n, J˜n) codes for which
max
t∈θ
max
j∈[J˜n]
1
Ln,t
∑
l∈[Ln,t]
W⊗nt (D
c
j |x(t)jl ) ≤ T
1
4 · 2−n a
′
2
holds for sufficiently large n ∈ N, and the strong secrecy level is fulfilled for every channel t ∈ θ by
I(J ;Zns ) ≤ −10ǫ log(10ǫ) + 10nǫ log |C|
which tends to zero for n→∞ for all channels s ∈ S to the eavesdropper. Thus we have shown that
RS = min
t∈θ
max
p∈P(A)
(I(p,Wt)− max
s:(s,t)∈S×θ
I(p, Vs))
is an achievable secrecy rate for the compound wiretap channel ∪t∈θWt in the case where the channel state
to the legitimate receiver is known at the transmitter.
Remark. By considering the converse of Theorem 3.11, we get for each t ∈ θ possible channel realisations
Wt := {(Wt, Vs) : s = 1, . . . S}. Then we can describe the compound channel as W = ∪t∈θWt. In accordance
to the case of no CSI for each t ∈ θ we obtain that
CS(Wt) = lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U→Xn→Y nt Z
n
s
(I(U ;Y nt )− sup
s∈S
I(U ;Zns )).
Proposition 3.12. The secrecy capacity of the compound wiretap channel in the case where only the channel
state to the legitimate receiver is known at the transmitter CS,CSIt(W) is given by
CS,CSIt(W) = inf
t∈θ
CS(Wt).
Now, additionally let us assume that each Vs is a degraded version of every Wt for s ∈ S and t ∈ θ. Then
as shown in Lemma 3.9 I(X ;Yt|Zs) is a concave function with respect to the input distribution pX = p. In
particular this still holds for mins∈S I(X ;Yt|Zs). Now because the random variablesX,Yt, Zs form a Markov
chain for all t ∈ θ and s ∈ S and
min
s∈S
I(X ;Yt|Zs) = I(X,Yt)−max
s∈S
I(X,Zs),
for any t ∈ θ we get the upper bound on the secrecy rate as the secrecy capacity of a single channel Wt with
S channels to the eavesdropper. Then we can conclude
Proposition 3.13. The secrecy capacity of the channel where only the channel states to the legitimate
receiver are known and the channels to the eavesdropper are degraded versions of those to the legitimate
receiver is given by
CS,CSIt(W) = min
t∈θ
max
p∈P(A)
(I(p,Wt)−max
s∈S
I(p, Vs)).
3.5. Compound wiretap channel with CS = CS,CSI
Let W := {Wt, Vs : t = 1, . . . T, s = 1, . . . S} with S 6= T and the pair (t, s) unknown to both the
transmitter and the legitimate receiver. In addition let us assume that
∃ tˆ ∈ θ ∀ t ∈ θ ∃Ut : Wtˆ = UtWt, (48)
which means that Wtˆ is a degraded version of all channel Wt with t 6= tˆ. We further assume that
∃ sˆ ∈ S ∀ s ∈ S ∃ Uˆs : Vs = UˆsVsˆ, (49)
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which means that all Vs with s 6= sˆ are degraded versions of Vsˆ. Then we can show that the capacity of this
channel equals the capacity of the same channel with CSI at the transmitter, e.g.
CS(W) = CS,CSI(W).
First, by Theorem 3.6 it holds that
CS(W) ≥ max
M→X→(YtZs)
min
(t,s)
(I(M,Yt)− I(M,Zs)), (50)
where M is an auxiliary random variable, such that M,X, (Yt, Zs) form a Markov chain M → X → (YtZs)
in this order. Now let
p∗MX = arg max
M→X→(YtˆZsˆ)
(I(M,Ytˆ)− I(M,Zsˆ))
the joint distribution of M and X that achieves capacity for the single wiretap channel (Wtˆ, Vsˆ). Because
the capacity of the compound wiretap channel W is less than or equal the capacity of each single channel
we obtain
CS,CSI(W) ≤ I(p∗M ,Wtˆ · P ∗X|M )− I(p∗M , Vsˆ · P ∗X|M ) = CS(Wtˆ, Vsˆ)
≤ I(p∗M , Ut(Wt · P ∗X|M ))− I(p∗M , Uˆs(Vsˆ · P ∗X|M ))
≤ I(p∗M ,Wt · P ∗X|M )− I(p∗M , Vs · P ∗X|M ) (51)
for all (s, t) ∈ S × θ because of (48), (49). Then by the last inequality it follows that
I(p∗M ,Wtˆ · P ∗X|M )− I(p∗M , Vsˆ · P ∗X|M ) = min
(s,t)
(I(p∗M ,Wt · P ∗X|M )− I(p∗M , Vs · P ∗X|M ))
≤ max
M→X→(YtZs)
min
(t,s)
(I(M,Yt)− I(M,Zs))
Now taking into account (50) and (51) we end in
CS,CSI(W) ≤ CS(W)
and therewith for this channel the lower bound of the capacity without CSI matches the capacity of the
compound wiretap channel with CSI.
4. EXAMPLES
In this section we provide some examples which display some striking features of compound wiretap
channels as opposed to the usual compound channels. Our first example shows clearly that for compound
wiretap channels with CSI at the transmitter the strategy of sending both the message and the randomisation
parameter does not work. The second one demonstrates that even in the case where the sets of channels to
the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper both are convex, we can have
CS,CSI(W) > 0 and CS(W) = 0,
as opposed to the case of the usual compound channel where the Minimax-Theorem applies.
In the following we use some simple facts which we state here without proof.
Fact 1. The binary entropy function
h(x) := −x log x− (1− x) log(1− x), x ∈ [0, 1],
is strictly increasing on [0, 12 ].
Fact 2. Let η ∈ [0, 1] and set
Dη :=
(
1− η η
η 1− η
)
.
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Then for every τ, τ ′ ∈ [0, 1] it follows that
DτDτ ′ = Dτ+τ ′−2ττ ′ .
Moreover, if τ, τ ′ ∈ (0, 12 ) then
τ + τ ′ − 2ττ ′ ∈ (0, 1
2
) and τ + τ ′ − 2ττ ′ > τ, τ ′.
Fact 3. For τ, t ∈ [0, 1]
(1− t)D0 + tDτ = Dtτ .
4.1. Example 1
Consider a compound wiretap channel W = {(Wt, Vt) : t = 0, 1} in the case of CSI at the transmitter.
First we define the channels to the legitimate receiver and to the eavesdropper for t = 0 by
W0 = Dη, η ∈ [0, 1
2
), η ≈ 0, V0 := DτW0, τ ∈ [0, 1
2
), τ ≈ 0,
and for t = 1, τˆ ∈ (0, 1/2]
W1 := DτˆV0 = DτˆDτW0, V1 :=
(
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
)
.
Hence V0 and W1 are degraded versions of W0 and
I(p, V1) = 0, ∀p ∈ P(A)
by definition of V1. Now for every p ∈ P(A) we can choose τ small enough, that
I(p,W0)− I(p, V0) < I(p,W1).
Now with p0 = (
1
2 ,
1
2 ), ν > 0 and because we have CSI at the transmitter we have by the defining equations
(14) and (15)
Jn = 2
n[I(p0,W0)−I(p0,V0))−ν]
Ln,0 = 2
n[I(p0,V0)+
ν
4 ]
such that we obtain
JnLn,0 = 2
n[I(p0,W0)−
3ν
4 ].
But for τˆ close to 1/2 it holds then that
I(p0,W0)− 3ν
4
> I(p0,W1) = max
p∈P(A)
I(p,W1) = CCSI{W0,W1},
where CCSI{W0,W1} is the capacity of a compound channel with CSI at the transmitter. Hence we have
shown, that we can achieve reliable transmission of the message j ∈ [Jn], but identifying both the message
and the randomizing indices is not possible for all pairs j ∈ [Jn] and l ∈ [Ln,t]. This is in contrast to the
case where we have only one channel to both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper (cf. [8], [5]).
4.2. Example 2
Now, for η, τ ∈ (0, 12 ) we set
W0 = Dη, V0 := DτW0 = Dη+τ−2ητ ,
W1 := DτV0 = D2τ−2τ2W0, V1 := DτW1.
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Notice that V0 is a degraded version of W0, W1 of V0, and V1 of W1. Next we define for t ∈ [0, 1]
Wt := (1− t)W0 + tW1
=
[
(1− t)D0 + tD2τ−τ2]W0, (52)
Vt := (1− t)V0 + tV1
= Dτ
[
(1− t)D0 + tD2τ−2τ2
]
W0
= DτWt (53)
By the definition, the set of channels to the legitimate receiver {Wt} and the set of channels to the eaves-
dropper {Vt} both are convex. Nevertheless we will show now, that for the compound wiretap channel
W := {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ [0, 1]} we have
CS,CSI(W) > 0, CS(W) = 0.
To this end, note that by (52), fact 3, and fact 2 we have
Wt = Dt(2τ−τ2)Dη = Df(t,η,τ)
with
f(t, η, τ) := η + t(2τ − 2τ2)− 2ηt(2τ − 2τ2) ∈ (0, 1
2
). (54)
Similarly from (53) and fact 2 we obtain
Vt = DτDf(t,η,τ) = Dτ+f(t,η,τ)−2τf(t,η,τ)
Additionally from (54) and fact 2 we get
τ + f(t, η, τ)− 2τf(t, η, τ) ∈ (0, 1
2
) and
τ + f(t, η, τ)− 2τf(t, η, τ) > f(t, η, τ). (55)
Taking p = (1/2, 1/2) we obtain for every t ∈ [0, 1]
I(p,Wt)− I(p, Vt) = h(τ + f(t, η, τ)− 2τf(t, η, τ)) − h(f(t, η, τ)) > 0
where the last inequality follows from fact 1 and (55). Thus we have shown that
CS,CSI(W) > 0
holds by Theorem 3.5.
In order to show that CS(W) = 0, we have to employ our multiletter converse in the case of no CSI,
Proposition 3.8. First, a simple algebra shows that for any t ∈ [0, 1]
Vt = ((1 − t)D0 + tD2τ−2τ2)V0
by (53) and thus each Vt is a degraded version of V0. Let us now consider the Markov chain U → Xn →
(Y nt , Z
n
t ) where the transition from the random variable U to Y
n
t is governed by PY nt |U = V
⊗n
t · PXn|U for
all t ∈ [0, 1]. Then we obtain that each PY nt |U is a degraded version of PY n0 |U = V ⊗n0 · PXn|U , and the data
processing inequality implies that for each n ∈ N
max
t∈[0,1]
I(U, Y nt ) = I(U, Y
n
0 ) (56)
for all distributions PUXn that satisfy the Markov chain condition U → Xn → (Y nt , Znt ).
On the other hand, since W1 = DτV0 we obtain for the matrix PZn1 |U = W
⊗n
1 ·PXn|U by the data processing
inequality and (56) for all n ∈ N
I(U,Zn1 )− max
t∈[0,1]
I(U, Y nt ) = I(U,Z
n
1 )− I(U, Y n0 ) ≤ 0,
for all PUXn . Then Proposition 3.8 implies that
CS(W) = 0
as desired.
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W0 Dτ V0
Wt Vt
W1 Dτ V1
Dτˆ
Figure 1. Compound wiretap channel W := {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ [0, 1]} of Ex. 2
